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Essay 
DEFENDANT SILENCE AND RHETORICAL STASIS 
STEPHEN E. SMITH 
Silence disrupts the classic arrangement of argumentation by 
preventing the traditional narrowing of issues—i.e., the 
identification of points of stasis.  This burdens the side against which 
silence is deployed.  When the defendant invokes the right to silence, 
the prosecution must address every possible defense.  In those rare 
instances where a defendant’s silence may be raised by the 
prosecution, the defendant may be put in a position of concession on 
multiple fronts.  In either case, the economy of argument anticipated 
by classical rhetoric is lost.
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DEFENDANT SILENCE AND RHETORICAL STASIS 
STEPHEN E. SMITH? 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The  rhetorical  term  stasis  (also  status)  refers  to  the  point  at  which  
battle is joined between two parties in judicial argument.1  It is the disputed 
point between the parties out of a sea of potential disagreements; it is the 
focal point of the parties’ energies.2  For example, the point of stasis in a 
civil contract suit may be whether there was performance or whether a 
failure to perform constituted a breach.  In rare cases, it may also be both, 
though it is an unusual disagreement where at least some points are not 
agreed or stipulated—we save our energy for particular issues, the points 
of stasis. 
A criminal defendant who asserts his right to silence may take 
advantage of stasis opportunities.  The invocation of the right to silence 
disclaims any particular dispute, putting the prosecutor to proof on all 
possible underlying issues.  On the other hand, a prosecutor who points to 
the defendant’s  silence at  trial,  when that  is  permitted,  can take away the 
advantage.  In the prosecutor’s hands, silence may operate as a concession 
by the defendant on all possible issues.  In either case, silence may disrupt 
traditional rhetorical approaches to argument. 
II.  STASIS CATEGORIES IN RHETORIC 
While there are many described categories of stasis, this Essay posits a 
commonly used set of four: conjectural, definitional, qualitative, and 
translative.3 
                                                                                                                     
? Associate Clinical Professor of Law, Santa Clara University School of Law. 
1 See LINDA WOODSON,  A HANDBOOK OF MODERN RHETORICAL TERMS 57 (1979) (referring to 
status and stasis as both meaning “[t]he proposition, or definition, or critical issue to be considered in a 
piece of discourse”).  This type of argument differs from a deliberative or epideictic argument. 
2 See Antoine Braet, The Classical Doctrine of Status and the Rhetorical Theory of 
Argumentation, 20 PHIL. & RHETORIC, no. 2, 1987, at 79, 81 (“During the preparation of their speeches 
both parties imagine that they are in the courtroom. . . . [T]hey anticipate their opponent’s arguments 
and decide on their reaction to them.  In this way, they ultimately deduce . . . the crucial question that 
the judge must answer.”). 
3 See Braet, supra note 2, at 83 (discussing the four statuses that “giv[e] the defense [of denial] 
some substance”).  See generally CICERO, DE INVENTIONE, DE OPTIMO GENERE ORATORUM & TOPICA 
(H.M. Hubbell trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1949) (c. 85 B.C.E.) (discussing four categories of stasis).  
Other writers have come up with different categories.  See Janet  B.  Davis,  Stasis Theory, in 
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Conjectural stasis concerns whether an act or incident took place.4  In a 
murder case for instance, the alleged victim may be missing.  Is she dead, 
or  is  she  secretly  eloping  in  Tahiti?   The  point  of  stasis  in  this  case  is  
conjectural—did the thing happen? 
Definitional stasis is a point of contention over what the thing is or 
should be called.5  In  our  murder  case,  let’s  say the body has been found 
and an impression from a ring on the defendant’s finger is found on her 
chest.   There  is  no  doubt  that  she  is  dead,  and  (let’s  posit)  that  the  
defendant was physically responsible for the death.  Was it murder?  Was it 
manslaughter?  Was it an accident?  When we seek to define the act, we 
engage a stasis of definition. 
Qualitative stasis addresses the nature of the act.  Justification, for 
instance, is a question of qualitative stasis.6  Here,  the  argument  is  not  
about the occurrence of the act, or what it might otherwise be called, but 
why  it  should  be  excused.   In  our  murder  case,  the  defendant  may  assert  
that the alleged victim had come at him with a knife, and while he 
performed the act and intended to harm the victim, the quality of the act 
was defensive.  
Finally, translative stasis is a point of disagreement over place, i.e., 
jurisdiction.7  Our defendant may argue, “wait a minute, this (allegedly) 
happened in Nevada, not California.  Why do you think you can prosecute 
me?” 
There are necessarily overlaps—or grey areas—between the categories 
of stasis.  It may be asked, for instance, where criminal intent questions 
belong—are they definitional or qualitative? 
As a logical matter, the categories of stasis are progressive and at odds 
with one another.8  If  the  agreed  point  of  stasis  is  definitional,  then  the  
previous point of conjectural stasis is conceded.  If the battle is joined at 
the point of qualitative stasis, then the points of conjectural and definitional 
status  are  both  conceded.   Translative  stasis  is  an  exception  from  this  
progressive relationship: where the argument should take place is largely 
independent of the other stasis categories and does not require their 
concession.  
Consideration  of  these  points  of  attack  is  a  part  of  the  job  for  any  
lawyer engaged in a dispute.  Whether he or she is thinking of them in 
                                                                                                                     
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RHETORIC AND COMPOSITION 693, 693–95 (Theresa Enos ed. 1996) (describing 
thirteen points of stasis set forth by Hermogenes). 
4 Davis, supra note 3, at 693–94. 
5 Id. at 694. 
6 See id. (providing an example of assault where the defendant must take the stasis of quality as 
the site of the argument in order to address mitigating circumstances). 
7 Id. 
8 Braet, supra note  2,  at  83;  see also DAVID ZAREFSKY,  ARGUMENTATION: THE STUDY OF 
EFFECTIVE REASONING pt. 2, at 119 (2d ed. 2005) (describing the progressive nature of stasis). 
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terms of rhetorical categories (probably not) is beside the point.  The 
economics of argumentation require assessment of a case’s stasis points. 
These  points  must  be  considered  for  at  least  two  reasons.   First,  of  
course, they determine the strengths and weaknesses of a case.  Where are 
argument resources best deployed?  Will it be more fruitful to focus on 
whether the thing occurred, or whether its occurrence is subject to excuse?  
Second, it is typically folly to join a case at every point of stasis.  
Preservation of the party’s and counsel’s credibility are at stake—you 
cannot say you did not do it and did it in self-defense and expect to gain 
the audience’s favor.  Elections must be made in most disputes. 
III.  STASIS AND THE RIGHT TO SILENCE 
The stasis question is complicated, however, when the issue of silence 
enters  the calculus.   It  is  unremarkable to  note that  the Fifth Amendment  
provides criminal defendants a right against self-incrimination.9  This  is  
widely regarded as a right to silence.10  Silence  affords  unusual  stasis  
opportunities to defendants who invoke it and to prosecutors when they are 
permitted to point to it. 
By standing silent, a defendant keeps stasis options open.  The typical 
justification for remaining silent is to avoid revealing information that will 
help the prosecution make its case.11  But it can have additional benefits.  
When a defendant remains silent, no point of stasis is immediately 
apparent.  The questions of conjecture, definition, quality, and translation 
are all left open.  This has two effects.  First, the prosecution must expend 
more resources, as it is unable to focus on particular investigative targets, 
and instead must address each potential point of stasis.  Second, the 
defense has the converse opportunity to develop defenses along each stasis 
category.12 
                                                                                                                     
9 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
10 See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (identifying the constitutionally 
protected right to silence and describing procedural safeguards designed to protect it). 
11 See, e.g., Howes v. Fields, 132 S. Ct. 1181, 1186 (2012) (reporting that in a Fifth Amendment 
self-incrimination case the defendant “eventually confessed to engaging in sex acts with the boy”). 
12 Rule 3.1 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct protects defense attorneys pursuing a 
stasis-motivated approach to representation, providing: 
A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue 
therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous, 
which includes a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of 
existing law.  A lawyer for the defendant in a criminal proceeding, or the respondent 
in a proceeding that could result in incarceration, may nevertheless so defend the 
proceeding as to require that every element of the case be established. 
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2012).  In essence, this rule provides that no point of stasis 
must be conceded by a defendant’s attorney.  Even if the defendant’s unspoken, true focus is a point of 
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Keeping these lines of argument open is a key reason for maintaining 
silence as a defendant.  When silence is maintained, the defendant is 
cipher.  He may be a focus or target of investigation (and, of course, there 
may be evidence against him in whatever quantity), but he has not 
indicated where and how he may attempt to find his way out from under a 
charge. 
When the defendant speaks, however, this flexibility may be lost.  In a 
recent case before the Supreme Court, sheriffs interrogated the defendant, a 
prisoner, about allegations of sexual abuse committed against a minor 
before his incarceration.13  After  five  to  seven  hours  of  questioning,  the  
defendant confessed to engaging in sex acts with the boy.14  When the 
defendant made his statement, he lost alternatives.  Confessing to the acts 
gave up his ability to engage conjectural stasis because he conceded the act 
happened.  He likely lost at least some of his ability to proceed at the point 
of definitional stasis—sex acts with a minor may provide some definitional 
leeway, but any possible definitions are likely criminal ones.  He also lost 
most of his opportunities to argue qualitative stasis.  Lastly, there are few 
excuses or justifications for sex acts with minors, so his confession likely 
established jurisdictional prerequisites for his prosecution—the point of 
translative stasis. 
It may seem odd that a defendant could remain silent and still keep the 
stasis  of  qualification  in  play.   If  a  defendant  is  silent  regarding  a  
justification for his actions, does he lose the ability to claim it?  Where is 
the benefit of silence if you must breach it to take advantage of a point of 
stasis?  To the extent this is true there may, indeed, be no benefit to silence 
vis-à-vis this category of stasis.  In many cases, however, it is not true.  
For example, self-defense is a typical justification that fits within the 
stasis of qualification.  As a matter of criminal law, the defendant may not 
need to establish that an act was done for self-defense.  Accordingly, he 
need not forgo his silence to establish the justification.  For instance, 
California criminal jury instructions provide, in pertinent part, that “The 
People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant did not act in lawful (self-defense/ [or] defense of another).  If 
the People have not met this burden, you must ?nd the defendant not guilty 
of <insert crime(s) charged>.”15  Accordingly, silence may be maintained 
                                                                                                                     
definitional or qualitative stasis, he may decline to indicate that, requiring the prosecution to address 
every avenue. 
13 Howes, 132 S. Ct. at 1185. 
14 Howes, 132 S. Ct. at 1186.  The Court reversed the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit and upheld the district court’s denial of the motion to suppress, holding that the interrogation 
was a non-custodial interrogation as the defendant was permitted to return to his cell at any time.  Id. at 
1185, 1188–89, 1194. 
15 JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 3470 (2013).  The instruction 
continues in the following bench note: 
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while qualitative stasis is retained. 
A defendant’s silence may also benefit the prosecution, however.  For 
instance, in Salinas v. Texas,16 the  prosecutor  at  trial  pointed  to  the  
defendant’s silence as evidence that he had participated in the murder of 
two brothers.17  The  defendant  remained  silent  when  asked  if  a  ballistics  
report would link shell casings to a gun he possessed.18  The United States 
Supreme Court held that a suspect who remains mute has not done enough 
to put police interrogators on notice that he or she is invoking his or her 
Fifth Amendment right.19  As  a  result,  the  prosecutor  was  permitted  to  
point out the defendant’s silence.  In such a case, the trier of fact may, as 
the prosecutor hopes, interpret that silence in a particular way. 
What did the prosecutor get from his ability to remark upon silence?  
The jurors were expected to infer that the defendant’s silence indicated that 
yes, the shells were from his gun.  This took various points of stasis out of 
the defendant’s control.  Rather than requiring the prosecution to present 
evidence of elements sufficient to render certain points of stasis irrelevant, 
this “silence evidence” could enable the prosecution to shift the burden 
(practically if not technically) to the defendant.  The jurors could 
conjecturally infer from the “silence evidence” that the act had occurred 
and that the defendant had been the actor.  They could further infer that the 
act, definitionally, was murder (or a homicide of some type).  After all, if it 
were something else, say, an accident, the defendant would have spoken.  
The same reasoning applies to qualitative stasis—if defendant were 
contesting it, he would speak, would he not?  “I acted in self-defense!” 
When the prosecution is able to point to silence in the course of a trial, 
it is relieved of having to detail even the most basic question—“what is its 
argument?”  Instead, the defendant is placed in the position of having to 
face every possible point of stasis.  Practically, this may require defendants 
to abandon silence once trial arrives.  The stasis-related ambiguity of their 
previous silence requires them to speak to remove that ambiguity. 
                                                                                                                     
Instructional Duty: The court must instruct on a defense when the defendant requests 
it and there is substantial evidence supporting the defense.  The court has a sua 
sponte duty to instruct on a defense if there is substantial evidence supporting it and 
either the defendant is relying on it or it is not inconsistent with the defendant’s 
theory of the case.  When the court concludes, however, that the defense is 
supported by substantial evidence and is inconsistent with the defendant’s theory of 
the case, it should ascertain whether defendant wishes instruction on this alternate 
theory. 
Id. 
16 133 S. Ct. 2174 (2013).  Salinas is the muse that inspired this Essay. 
17 Id. at 2178.  
18 Id.  
19 Id. at 2180–81. 
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IV.  CONCLUSION 
In the hands of either side to a dispute, silence disrupts the classic 
arrangement of argumentation.  The traditional narrowing of issues may be 
lost.  This creates burdens on the side against which silence is deployed.  
The prosecution is left with the burden of addressing every possible angle 
of defense.  In those rare instances where the defendant’s silence may be 
raised, he or she may be put in a position of concession on multiple fronts 
or  lose  the  ability  to  remain  silent.   In  either  case,  the  economy  of  
argument anticipated by classical rhetoric is lost. 
